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NOTE
CURING CABLEVISION PRESCRIBING A
FUNCTIONAL SOLUTION TO A
TECHNICAL ASTIGMATISM
ADAM ADLER*

ABSTRACT

In a string of recent copyright cases, judges have increasingly
adopted a technical approach to copyright law. Rather than evaluating
contested technologies based on how the technologies are used, courts
have focused their analysis on technical details of implementation. As
a consequence, courts have constructed rules that limit technologies not
in what they do, but how they do it. In this Article, I argue that courts
should evaluate technologies based on functional considerations. I
argue that this functional approach is constitutionally, statutorily, and
practically preferable to a technical approach. Finally, I show that a
functional approach would lead to decisions that are clearer, easier to
understand, and better-reasoned.
ABSTRACT

....................................................

122

INTRODUCTION...............................................

124

I. RECOGNIZING THE TECHNICAL APPROACH

125

...................

A. The Public Performance Right...........
.......
1. Redd Horne & On Command
........... ..........
2. Cablevision
............................
3. Aereo
...........................
.....
B. The Reproduction Right....
..................
1. ReDigi
.........................
.......
2. Cablevision
............................
C. Constructing the Pure-Technical Approach......................
1I. DEFINING THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH

.....................

126
127
128
132
133
133
134
135
137

* Yale Law School. J.D.. 2015: Stanford University. B.S. 2012. I would like to thank
Rachel Rudinaer. Victoria Cundiff. Firas Abuzaid. Molly and Stuart Adler. Philico
Kotlaba. Matt Kemp, and Alex Kasner for their many insightful thoughts and
comments.

122

2014]

CuringCablevision

..................
A. Functional Equivalence ...........
B. The Pure-Functional Approach ......................
C. Functional Reducibility: Testing the Technical
.....
..............................
Approach
........
1. Functional Reducibility Defined ........
2. Functional Reducibility as a Measurement:
.....
Bridging the Gap Qualitatively ...........
..........
.......
D. The Efficient-Technical Approach

123

137
139
141
141

143
143
III. THE ADVANTAGES OF A FUNCTIONAL-APPROACH................... 146
.............. 146
A. Innovation and Creativity.............
....... 148
...............
B. Constitutional Consistency
1. The Progress Clause Supports a Functional
..... 148
Approach to Copyright Law.............
2. The Progress Clause Suggests that Courts Should
Interpret the Copyright Act According to a
Functional Approach............................. 150
........ 152
....................
C. Better Adjudication ..
1. Judges Are Not Good at Evaluating Technical
152
..........
..........................
Details .
2. Judges Are Good at Evaluating Function...................158
IV. THE ADVANTAGES (AND DISADVANTAGES) OF THE
....................
EFFICIENT-TECHNICAL APPROACH

159

A. Advantages of the Efficient-Technical Approach............159
1. The Efficient-Technical Approach Is Less Radical
and More Conservative Than a Functional
....... 160
.........................
Approach
2. The Efficient-Technical Approach Avoids
Inefficiencies and Waste..............................160
B. The Disadvantages of the Efficient-Technical
....... 160
............................
Approach
1. The Efficient-Technical Approach Requires
....... 161
Advanced Technical Analysis ..........
2. The Problems with Efficiency...................162
V.CONCLUSION...........................................

164

124

BUFFALO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTYLA WJOURNAL

[Vol. X

INTRODUCTION

Judges do not make good engineers. In a string of recent copyright
cases, judges across the country have increasingly adopted a technical
approach to copyright law. Rather than evaluating contested
technologies based on how the technologies are used, courts have
focused their analysis on technical details of implementation. As a
consequence, courts have constructed rules that focus on form rather
than function-rules that limit technologies not in what they do, but
how they do it. These decisions have encouraged inventions that
engineers and commentators have described as "inefficient and
convoluted,"' "Rube Goldbergian," 2 "idiotic," 3 and "monstrously
unscalable." 4 From a legal standpoint, they have led to paradoxical and
inconsistent judicial holdings. For example, under some courts'
interpretation of the Copyright Act, it would be legal to create and
store one million identical copies of a television show for general
distribution, but illegal to create and store one copy.5
In this Article, I argue that courts should evaluate technologies
based on how they are used rather than on their underlying
implementations. In advancing my argument, I will introduce and
evaluate three approaches to copyright law: a pure-technical approach,
which evaluates technology based on implementation details, a purefunctional approach, which evaluates technology based on how the
technologies are used, and a hybrid approach, which looks to both
implementation and usage. Ultimately, I will show that the purefunctional approach is statutorily, constitutionally, and practically
preferable.
This paper builds on the current literature in three ways. First,

Jerry Brito, How Government Regulations Distort the Television Airwaves,
REASON (Apr. 25, 2013), http://reason.com/archives/2013/04/25/how-governmentregulations-distort-the-t [http://perma.cc/9NN2-VZ5B].
2 Mike Masnick, How CopynightHasDriven OnlineStreamingInnovators
Insane,INNOVATION (Aug. 31, 2012),

http://www.techdirt.com/blog/innovation/articles/20120830/13260820222/howcopyright-has-driven-online-streaming-innovators-insane.shtml
[http://perma.cc[F3VL-EWSV].
3 Farhad Manjoo, Don't Root for Aereo, the World's Most Ridiculous Start-up,
PANDODAILY (July 14, 2012), http://pandodaily.com/2012/07/14/dont-root-for-aereothe-worlds-most-ridiculous-start-up [http://perma.cclAV45-ZD32]; see also James
Grimmelmann, Why Johnny Can't Stream: How Video Copynght Went Insane,
ARSTECHNICA
(Aug. 30, 2012), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/08/whyjohnny-cant-stream-how-video-copyright-went-insane [http://perma.cc/IJPE3-RC8Y]
(referring to a court-approved technology as "ridiculous").
4 Manjoo, supranote 3.
See infra Part I.A, discussing the decision in Cartoon Network LP v. CSC
Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 138 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. denied,557 U.S. 946 (2009).
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while numerous scholars have criticized technical decisions, 6 few have
synthesized holdings across cases to identify a consistent judicial
approach. Even fewer have proposed an alternate framework for courts
to apply in future cases.' Second, this paper draws significantly from
engineering principles and concepts. While courts often have difficulty
comparing technologies and determining the extent to which new and
old technologies differ, engineers and computer scientists have
developed robust methods and techniques for evaluating, testing, and
comparing different technical problems and solutions. As far as I can
tell, this paper is the first to incorporate these methods when
considering how courts should approach technical cases. 8 The final
aspect of this paper that distinguishes it from similar works is its
timeliness. Over the past two or three years, courts have issued a several
technology-based copyright decisions. The Supreme Court even
considered the issue recently in American BroadcastingCos., Inc. v.
Aereo, Inc 9 This paper is the first to evaluate these recent decisions
and to consider where courts currently stand on this issue.
This paper has four parts. In Part I, I will review a variety of
copyright cases to highlight a split that exists in different courts'
approach to technology. I will show how some courts have adopted a
pure-technical approach while others have implemented a more
balanced system of statutory interpretation. In Part II, I will define the
pure-functional approach to copyright law, as well as the efficienttechnical approach, a hybrid between the pure-technical and purefunctional approaches. In Part III, I will show how a pure-functional
approach to copyright is constitutionally, jurisprudentially, and
technically preferable to a technical approach. Finally, in Part IV, I will
review the relative advantages and disadvantages of the efficienttechnical approach.
I. RECOGNIZING THE TECHNICAL APPROACH

Courts across the country have splintered. On one side, a number

See, e.g., Dennis S. Karjala, "Copying" and "Piracy"in the Digital Age, 52
WASHBURN L.J. 245, 249 (2013) (noting that "copying," as defined in the Copyright
Act, does not take into account modern technologies).
7 The article that comes closest to proposing a decisional framework proposes an
approach that is drastically different from the one at the center of this paper. See
Deborah Tussey, Technology Matters: The Courts, Media Neutrality, and New
Technologies,12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 427 (2005) (describing a "media neutral" approach
to copyright law).
8 Specifically, this Article introduces the legal analogues of "black-box testing"
and "reductability," concepts which are explained in greater detail later in this paper.
See discussion infrain Part II.
' 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
6
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of courts, led largely by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, have
decided to interpret the Copyright Act in a manner that emphasizes
implementation details and technical minutia. On the other side, courts
led by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals have focused more on the
use, function, and application of technology. In this Part, I will discuss
a variety of copyright cases from around the country. As I describe the
facts and holdings of the cases, I will show how courts differ from one
another and will identify patterns and trends that have become
prevalent in ongoing disputes.
This Part has three Sections. First, I will explain how courts have
arrived at different interpretations of the § 106(4) right of public
performance and will discuss the Supreme Court's decision in Aereo.
Second, I will discuss how courts have arrived at different
interpretations of the § 106(1) right of reproduction. Third, I will
synthesize examples to show how many courts have adopted what
largely amounts to a pure-technical approach to copyright law.
A. The PublicPerformanceRight

The Copyright Act provides the owner of a copyright with the
exclusive right to "perform the copyrighted work publicly." 10 Despite
several amendments to the Act, the meaning and scope of "public
performance" has been hotly contested for decades." Section 101 of
the Act states:
to perform or display a work "publicly" means-(1) to
perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any
place where a substantial number of persons outside of a
normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is
gathered; or (2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a
performance or display of the work to a place specified by
clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process,
whether the members of the public capable of receiving the
performance or display receive it in the same place or in
separate places and at the same time or at different times. 12

'0 17 U.S.C. §106 (6) (2012).
11 See, e.g., Aereo, 134 S. Ct. 2498; Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422
U.S. 151, 157 (1975) (deciding whether a restaurant owner can play the radio for his
customers); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 395
(1968) (deciding whether the retransmission of a television broadcast via coaxial cables
constitutes a public performance), superseded by statute, Copyright Revision Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553,90 Stat. 2541; Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191,
196 (1931) (determining whether a hotel proprietor violated the right of public
performance when he used a radio to allow customers to hear musical compositions).
1 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
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The meaning of this definition has been the subject of intense
litigation. In this Section, I will show how courts have interpreted § 101
in drastically different ways.
1.

ReddHorne& On Command

In Columbia PicturesIndustries,Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc.,13 the
owner of a video rental store created a service that allowed customers
to watch videos in private viewing booths located in the back of the
store. 14 At a customer's request, the clerk would insert a video cassette
into a VCR located at the front of the store and would transmit the
video signal to the customer's viewing booth.15 Columbia Pictures sued
the video store, claiming the store violated the § 101(4) right of public
performance. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals agreed. In reaching
its decision, the court relied on the commercial nature of the service. 16
Because the service was "open to the public," the court found that it
implicated the "transmit" clause of the § 101 public performance
definition."
The court, however, did not stop its analysis after making this
determination. Instead, it decided the case again on alternate grounds.
The court stated that the viewing service constituted a public
performance because, "although Maxwell's has only one copy of each
film, it shows each copy repeatedly to different members of the
public." 18 This alternate justification differs significantly from the
court's primary holding. Whereas the primary holding focuses broadly
on the relationship between the challenged service and the general
public, the second justification rests on a technical distinction that
required the court to determine whether a copy is "unique." While this
distinction did not alter the outcome in Redd Horne, it caused
substantial trouble in future cases.19
While Redd Horne was decided by the Third Circuit, courts in
other areas of the country were soon forced to grapple with the same
problems. For example, in On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia

" 749 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1984).
14 Id. at 156-57.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 159.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 It is interesting to note that the introduction of this inquiry was both unnecessary
and, relative to the court's primary reason for decision, unjustified. In this sense, the
alternative justification amounts to dicta. "A holding consists of those propositions ...
that (1) are actually decided, (2) are based upon the facts of the case, and (3) lead to
the judgment. If not a holding, a proposition stated in the case counts as dicta." Michael
Abramowicz & Maxwell Steams, DefinimgDicta,57 STAN. L. REv. 953, 1065 (2005).
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PicturesIndustnes,20a court in the Ninth Circuit considered the validity
of an early pay-per-view system. On Command developed a system for
the electronic delivery of video tapes in hotels. Participating hotels
would store a collection of video tapes in a central storage room.21
Using a wired transmission system, the hotel would allow patrons to
play videos remotely from their rooms.22 As in ReddHorne,the court
found that the transmission of videos constituted a public performance
as defined by § 101.23 Specifically, the court found that "hotel guests ...
[are] members of 'the public' . . . because the relationship between the

transmitter .. . and the audience ... is a commercial, 'public' one." 24
While a number of courts have relied on the relationship between
sender and receiver when assessing whether a transmission or
performance is "to the public," this distinction has recently been called
into question. Specifically, in CartoonNetwork v. CSCHoldings,Inc.
("Cablevision'),the Second Circuit abandoned the functional "natureof-the-relationship" test in favor of ReddHorne's"unique-copy" test.25
2. Cable vision
Cablevision is a cable company that provides television
programming to its subscribers. Like other companies, Cablevision
obtained license agreements with content providers to obtain
-26
permission to transmit television programs to its subscribers.
Following in the steps of TiVo, Cablevision planned to offer a Digital
Video Recording (DVR) system.27 DVR systems function like a digital
VCR. They allow users to record television programs and to store those
programs on local hard drives. 2 8 Unlike standard DVRs, however,
Cablevision intended to create a Remote Storage DVR (RS-DVR).
Cablevision's RS-DVR system would store recordings of programs at a
remote location, rather than on a device located in subscribers'
homes. 29 The technical details of the RS-DVR system are complex and
are outlined in detail in Figure 1.What matters most, however, is that,
to facilitate the system, Cablevision routed all television programs, 0.1
20
21
22
23
24
25

777 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
Id. at 788.
id
Id.at 790.
id.
Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121,138 (2d Cir. 2008), cert.

denied,557 U.S. 946 (2009).

See id. at 124-25.
Id.at 124.
28 See
Roamio Product Page, TiVo,
[http://perma.cc/6Q8J-VSPY].
29 Cartoon Network LP,536 F.3d at 124.
26
27

https://www.tivo.com/shop/roamio
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seconds a time, through an ingest buffer.3 0 When a customer requested
access to a program, the RS-DVR system would route the program, 1.2
seconds a time, through a secondary buffer before finally copying the
program to the subscriber's designated hard drive. 3 1 A subscriber
32
would only be able to access his or her designated hard drive. As a
result, if 1,000 subscribers requested a program, Cablevision would
create and store 1,000 copies of that program.33
Content providers filed suit, claiming the RS-DVR system
infringed their public performance right.34 In interpreting the statutory
definition of public performance, the Second Circuit deviated from the
approach used in On Command The court engaged in a great deal of
definitional and interpretational gymnastics and arrived at the
conclusion that "the transmission of a performance is itself a
performance." 35 Based on this interpretation, the court confusingly
decided that the relevant audience for § 101 was not the audience of the
underlyingperformance-allsubscribers who could view the television
program-but was instead the audience of the performance of the
performance-the audience of a specific transmission.36 Because each
user would receive a "unique" transmission, the court found that all
performances were necessarily -private. 37
In explaining its rationale, the court discussed the significance of
having a "unique copy." Citing ReddHorne,the court held that "the
use of a unique copy may limit the potential audience of a transmission
and is therefore relevant to whether that transmission is made 'to the
public.'" 38 In advancing this argument, however, the court walked into
the woods without a map and in the wrong direction-the court
adopted a technicalcriterion to evaluate a functionalimplication. That
is, the court was interested in limiting the size of a potential audience.
But instead of considering the audience of a transmission directly,the
court decided to use a nonsensical proxy. What is most bizarre is that
the court seemed to ignore the fact that in the very case it decided, the
creation and transmission of multiple unique copies 39 allowed an

30

Id. at 124-25.

Id. at 125.
33 See id. at 124-25.
3 Id at 126.
SId. at 134.
36 Id. at 135 ("It is evident that the transmit clause directs us to examine who
precisely is "capable of receiving" a particular transmission of a performance.").
37 See id. at 134-36.
38 Id. at 138.
39 That the phrase "multiple unique copies" is an oxymoron is the point. The fact
that identical copies are stored in multiple locations does not change the reality that
32
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audience of millionsto receive and view performances of copyrighted
works. Regardless of what one thinks about the outcome of
Cablevision,40 what is clear is that, when deciding the case, the Second
Circuit departed from the precedents set by the Third and Ninth circuits
by focusing on form rather than function.

they are, in fact, not "unique."
40 For reasons stated infra, in Part II, I believe the court
reached the correct
conclusion, but for the reason. I acknowledge, however, that even under a functional
approach, the case could have been decided in favor of either party. What matters most
is not the outcome, but the reasoning used to arrive at that outcome.

CuringCablevision
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FIGURE 1: CABLEVISION'S RS-DVR SYSTEM
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This figure illustrates each of the component steps of Cablevision's RS-DVR system. As Judge
Walker explained:
Under the new RS-DVR, [a] single stream of data is split into two streams. The first is routed
immediately to customers ....

The second stream flows into a device called the Broadband

Media Router ("BMR"), which buffers the data stream, reformats it,and sends it to the "Arroyo
Server," which consists, in relevant part, of two data buffers and a number of high-capacity hard
disks. The entire stream of data moves to the first buffer (the "primary ingest buffer"), at which
point the server automatically inquires as to whether any customers want to record any of that
programming. If a customer has requested a particular program, the data for that program move
from the primary buffer into a secondary buffer, and then onto a portion of one of the hard disks
allocated to that customer. As new data flow into the primary buffer, they overwrite a
corresponding quantity of data already on the buffer. The primary ingest buffer holds no more
than 0.1 seconds of each channel's programming at any moment. Thus, every tenth of a second,
the data residing on this buffer are automatically erased and replaced. The data buffer in the
BMR holds no more than 1.2 seconds of programming at any time. While buffering occurs at
other points in the operation of the RS-DVR, only the BMR buffer and the primary ingest
buffer are utilized absent any request from an individual subscriber.41

41

CartoonNetwork LP,536 F.3d at 124-25.
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3. Aereo
Cablevisionturned out to be an influential case. It inspired new
technologies that were designed to take advantage of the court's
technical reasoning. The most notable technology to follow Cablevision
was Aereo. Aereo allowed its subscribers to receive broadcast
television over the internet. But unlike prior services that courts have
found illegal,4 2 Aereo did not broadcast television signals directly.
Instead, it assigned each of its subscribers a mini-antenna.43 Each
antenna received a broadcast signal and used a remote hard drive (also
assigned to an individual subscriber) to store the transmission." Upon
request, Aereo would stream the program from the customer's
designated hard drive to the customer's computer or mobile device.
Aereo's antenna system was similar to Cablevision's RS-DVR in that it
went to great lengths to collect, create, and store independent,
"unique" files for each of its subscribers.
In response to the Aereo service, numerous content providers
filed suit, alleging that Aereo's service constituted an infringing public
performance. 46 In a straightforward application of its decision in
Cablevision,the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that Aereo's
system did not constitute a public performance.4 7 The court recognized
that Aereo was similar to Cablevision in two essential respects: first,
each transmission could only be received by one subscriber rather than
by the public at large. Second, each subscriber received a unique copy
of the underlying work.48
In response to the Second Circuit decision, the Plaintiffs appealed
to the Supreme Court. In a 6-3 decision, a fractured Supreme Court
reversed the court of appeals. 4 9 Notably, the Court disagreed about the
correct way to approach the case. Writing for the majority, Justice
Breyer argued that implementation details were irrelevant and that the
most important consideration was the way consumers interacted with
the technology. Specifically, Justice Breyer found that technological
differences should not matter so and that "the many [functional]

42 See generallyWPIX, Inc. v. Ivi, Inc. 691 F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 2012)
(holding that a
service that streamed copyrighted television live over the internet did not qualify as a
"cable system" under the Copyright Act), cert.denied,133 S. Ct. 1585 (2013).
43 WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. 712 F.3d 676, 683 (2d Cir. 2013).
4

45

Id.

d

46

Id. at 680.

47

Id. at 684-95.

48

Id.at 689-90.

49 Am. Broadcasting Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).

5o See id. at 2508.

similarities

133

CuringCablevision

2014]1

between

Aereo

and ...

cable

companies"

provides

sufficient reason to regulate Aereo as if it were a cable company meaning that Aereo should not be able to retransmit (or facilitate the
retransmission) of television signals. 51 In contrast, Justice Scalia,
writing in dissent, placed more emphasis on implementation details.
Scalia argued that it would be improper to treat Aereo like a cable
company for the simple reason that it is not a cable company.5 2 Scalia
went on to argue that a strict reliance on functional equivalence (which
he called "guilt-by-resemblance") 5 without considering prior
precedents or the text of a statute risks creating a "two-tier[ed] version
of the Copyright Act," where one part "applies to 'cable companies and
their equivalents' while the other governs everyone else."5 4
The cases described in this Section constitute only a sample55 of
the cases attempting to interpret and understand the meaning of § 101's
public performance clause. The cases adequately show how courts at all
levels have not been able to reach a consensus on the proper framework
for evaluation. I will revisit Cablevisionand Aereo in Part II.
B. The ReproductionRight
The use of a technical perspective when interpreting the Copyright
Act is not unique to courts' interpretation of "public performance." In
this Section I will show how courts have also adopted a technical
approach when interpreting and defining the § 106(1) reproduction
right.
1. ReDigi
56
ReDigi
The first case I will discuss is CapitolRecordsv. ReDigi.
operated a service that allowed consumers to resell digital music files
over the internet.57 The district court from the Southern District of New
York explained how ReDigi operates:
To sell music on ReDigi's website, a user must first download
ReDigi's "Media Manager.. .Once installed, Media Manager
analyzes the user's computer to build a list of digital music
files eligible for sale. A file is eligible only if it was purchased

5' Id. at 2507. Notably, the majority did not overturn the Second Circuit's decision
in Cablevision. See id. at 2510-11; id. at 2517 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
52 Id. at 2515 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that "there are material differences
between" Aereo and the cable systems considered by the Court in previous cases).
53 Id. at 2517 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
54 Id. at 2516 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 2506-07).
55 For more cases, see infra note 71.
56 934 F.Supp 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
17 Id. at 645-46.
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After this

validation process, Media Manager continually runs on the
user's computer and attached devices to ensure that the user
has not retained music that has been sold or uploaded for
sale.

...

If a copy is detected, Media Manager prompts the

user to delete the file.
The result of ReDigi's service was that after a customer sold a
music file, the file could not exist on the seller's computer. 59 Moreover,
the seller was no longer able to access the music file unless he made an
external copy. 60
Shortly after ReDigi introduced its service, Capitol Records filed
suit in the Southern District of New York, alleging that ReDigi
infringed on its reproduction right. 6 1 In deciding against ReDigi, the
court found that the end-state of the file (i.e., that only one copy of the
file existed at the end of an exchange) was irrelevant and that the only
consideration for the court was the technical question of whether the
music file had, in a strict sense, been copied or reproduced over the
course of the transaction. 62
2. Cablevision

Cablevisionimplicated not just the public performance right, but
also the reproduction right. As described above, Cablevision
implemented its RS-DVR system by copying television programs, 1.2
seconds at a time, into a buffer. 63 The buffer, however, was limited in
size, such that no data remained in the buffer for more than a few
seconds-information was constantly transferred and overwritten.
However, when a subscriber subsequently transmitted a request to see
the recorded program, he would be able to view the program in its
entirety as originally broadcast.65
Section 101 of the Copyright Act states that a work is only copied
if its embodiment in a medium is "sufficiently permanent or stable to
permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for
a period of more than transitory duration." When the Second Circuit

58

Id. at 645.

5 See id.
60 See id.
61 Id. at 647.
62 Id. at 650 (holding that ReDigi violated the reproduction right "regardless
of
whether one or multiple copies of the file exist" at the end of the transaction).
63 Suprafig.1.
64

Id.

65

See id
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considered Cablevision's system in the context of the reproduction
right, there was no question that the system reproduced copyrighted
works without permission.66 The only question for the Second Circuit
was whether the reproductions were sufficiently "fixed" to constitute a
"copy" under the Copyright Act.67 In deciding this question, the Second
Circuit focused most of its attention on the "transitory duration"
requirement of § 101. Its analysis once again privileged a technical
approach over an interpretation that would take into account the
broader policy goals of the Copyright Act.
Ultimately, the court provided a blanket justification for any
technical system that stores copies for only a brief period of time,
regardless of what is later done to or with the copy. 6 8 In essence, the
court applied a human-perception standard of "transitory" rather than
the more apt computer-centric standard. In doing so, the court ignored
the fact that a computer can, in 1.2 seconds, thoroughly copy, analyze,
and process billionsof bytes.69 So while the fixation may be fleeting in
time, it is substantial in volume. As a result, the court did not consider
the broad legal and functional implications of its decision. Rather than
focusing on the purpose of the Copyright Act, the court authorized a
particular technical approach which, as discussed below, if carried to its
logical conclusion would swallow § 106 of the Copyright Act whole.
C. Constructingthe Pure-TechnicalApproach

In the previous two Sections, I described a number of cases dealing
with the reproduction right and the public performance right.
Collectively, the cases highlight the fact that some courts, especially
those in the Second Circuit, interpret the Copyright Act in a manner
that creates implementation-based rules, standards and guidelines.
That is, rather than focusing on the service provided by a technology or
on the ways in which consumers interact with the technology, these
courts focus on the details of implementation: whether a copy is
6

See Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 129-30 (2d Cir.

2008), cert.denied,557 U.S. 946 (2009).
67

See id

Perhaps realizing this, the court attempted to limit the scope of its holding, stating
that its conclusion was limited only to the RS-DVR technology involved in the case. Id
at 139 ("This holding ... does not generally permit content delivery networks to avoid
liability by making copies of each item of content and associating one unique copy with
each subscriber to the network .... ). But as demonstrated by Aereo, without a
limiting condition or principle, the court's attempt to issue a narrow ruling was hardly
successful.
69 Eg., Jeff Tyson, How Computer Memory Works, How STUFF WORKS,
http://computer.howstuffworks.com/computer-memory2.htm
[http://perma.cc/T5A8RFG2] (indicating that modem CPUs can analyze "potentially billions of bytes per
second").
68
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"unique," whether a reproduction exists for less than 1.2 seconds,
whether a transmission can be received by one person or many people.
This approach, which I refer to as the pure-technical approach to
statutory interpretation, is characterized by a tendency to evaluate the
legitimacy of technology according to its implementation details. Under
the pure-technical approach, a service will be judicially acceptable if the
court finds its specific technical implementation compliant with courtmade technical guidelines. 7o
While some courts have adopted a pure (or close to pure)
technical approach, others (as in Redd Horne, On Command, and
Aereo) have focused more on the functional implications of
technology. The Aereo court found Aereo infringed the public
performance right because it transmitted, en masse, broadcast
transmissions to the general public over the internet; the ReddHorne
and On Command relied primarily on the functional relationship
between facility-owner and guest. It is worth noting that the cases
discussed above are by no means exhaustive. They represent only a
small sampling of the functional-technical interpretation debate.71 For
the remainder of this paper, I will use the cases described in this Part to
define, describe, and defend several alternatives to the pure-technical
approach.
I do not mean to suggest that judges adhering to a technical approach are
"activist" or arbitrary. When I say the guidelines are "court-made," I simply mean that
the guidelines are not written explicitly into the Copyright Act.
n For more cases that deal with these or similar issues, see generally,
for example,
United States v. Am. Soc. of Composers, Authors, Publishers, 627 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2010)
(deciding whether downloading a music file over the internet constitutes a public
performance), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 366 (2011); National Football League v.
PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 211 F.3d 10 (2d Cir. 2000) (deciding whether transmitting
a broadcast signal to a satellite which in turn publically broadcasts the signal to a
location outside the jurisdiction of the Copyright Act constitutes a public performance),
cert. denied,532 U.S. 941 (2001); and Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d
1510 (9th Cir. 1992) (deciding whether reverse-engineering computer code violates the
exclusive reproduction right); Warner Bros. Entm't Inc. v. WTV Sys., Inc., 824 F. Supp.
2d 1003 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (considering whether an automated DVD rental system, which
broadcasted movies over the internet, infringed on a movie studio's public performance
right). For criticisms of Cablevision, see, for example, Jeffrey Malkan, The Public
PerformanceProblem in Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 89 OR. L. REV.
505 (2010); Joshua C. Liederman, Note & Comment, Changing the Channel: The
CopyrightFixationDebate, 36 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 289 (2010); Marc
Miller, Comment, Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
585 (2010); and Christopher Vidiksis, Note, How to Buffer Your Way Out of A Scrape:
PotentialAbuse of the Cartoon Network v. Cablevision Decision,4 BROOK. J. CORP.
FIN. & COM. L. 139 (2009). But for praise of Cablevision, see, for example, Jesse
Harman, Case Note & Comment, DrawingA Line Between Directand Contributory
CopyrightInfringement: The Second Circuit'sTake on A Copying Service Provider's
DirectLiability in Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings, 19 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. L. 397 (2009).
70
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II. DEFINING THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH

While some courts have rejected the technical approach, few, if
any, have adopted a consistent alternative framework. In this section, I
will introduce such a framework, the pure-functional approach. Under
the pure-functional approach, courts would evaluate technologies
based on the technologies' functional capabilities.
This Part will have four Sections. First, I will introduce the concept
of functional equivalence -an essential element of the pure-functional
approach. Second, I will introduce and define the pure-functional
approach. Third, I will introduce the concept of functional reducibility
and will show how courts can use reducibility analysis to evaluate new
technologies. Finally, I will introduce the efficient-technical approach,
which represents a compromise between the pure-functional and puretechnical approaches.
A. FunctionalEquivalence
The principle underlying the pure-functional approach is that the
legal legitimacy of a technology should depend completely (or almost
completely) on what the technology allows an end-user to accomplish.
In other words, the implementation details of a given technology should
not significantly impact the technology's legitimacy in the copyright
context. A natural corollary of this principle is that, absent an extrinsic
harm, 7 2 two technologies that perform the same function should be
equally legitimate (or illegitimate) in the eyes of the law, regardless of
their underlying implementation. This principle, known to engineers as
a "black-box" approach, requires some parsing.
By extrinsic harm I mean a legally cognizable harm articulated and defined
without reference to the copyright claim implicated by the technology. Consider a
VCRX which allows users to time-shift incoming television programs but that, in the
process, releases poisonous radiation. In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), the Supreme Court held that time-shifting qualifies
as fair use. Nevertheless, environmental regulations prohibit the emission of poisonous
radiation. Even though the VCRXis functionally equivalent to a standard VCR, we
still have good cause to prohibit the device because of its implementation. Not because
it runs afoul of copyright law, but because it harms the environment. The requirement
that the harm be defined outside the scope of the copyright claim is essential. Because
the purpose of a legal functional framework is to determine, based on end-user
functionality, whether a given technology violates an exclusive copyright privilege, any
reference to an implementation-based copyright harm would assume an answer to the
problem we are trying to solve. Such an argument would constitute circular reasoning suggesting that a given technical implementation runs afoul of copyright law by running
afoul of copyright law.
7 The term "black-box" refers to a system whose implementation is hidden from
the end-user. See Boaz Barak, NON-BLACK-Box TECHNIQUES IN CRYPTOGRAPHY Vii
(Jan. 6, 2004) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Feinberg Graduate School of the Weizmann
http://www.boazbarak.org/Papers/thesis.pdf
of
Science),
Institute
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We can say an instance of technology (X) is functionally
equivalent to another instance of technology (1) if, from the
perspective of all potential end-users (and affected parties), Xperforms
the same function as Y In this definition, end-users are individuals for
whom the technology was designed.7 4
Functional equivalence applies to some of the technologies
discussed in the cases above. In Cablevision,for example, the court
found that, with respect to video recording and video playback,
Cablevision's RS-DVR system was functionally equivalent to standard
DVR systems-systems the Plaintiffs never challenged.7 6 Likewise, in
Aereo, the Second Circuit recognized that, with respect to video
recording and playback capabilities, Aereois functionally equivalent to
a DVR and Slingbox. When Aereo reached the Supreme Court,
functional equivalence was arguably the most important part of the
Court's decision-with the majority and dissent disagreeing about
whether Aereo's service was functionally equivalent to services
provided by cable companies.

[http://perma.cc/JJO6-PXXY]. Interestingly enough, there is an ongoing debate in
computer science about how technology should be tested. See Tyner Blain, Foundation
Series:Black Box and White Box Software Testing, TYNER BLAIN (Jan. 12, 2006),
http://tynerblain.com/blog/2006/01/12/foundation-series-black-box-and-white-boxsoftware-testing [http://perma.cc/2M66-XXDU]. Some advocate for black-box testing,
which ignores implementation details, others for white-box testing, which uses
implementation details to construct tricky edge-cases, and still others for grey-box
testing, which combines white and black box testing. Id. While the considerations
involved for computer scientists are radically different from the considerations required
for the Copyright Act, a review of the relevant computer science literature adds some
informative texture to the legal debate.
74 In almost all cases, the end-users will be consumers. This analysis is limited to
technologies which, once distributed, do not require any action by individuals other
than the end-user.
75 On an absolute level, standard DVR systems and Cablevision's RS-DVR system
are not functionally equivalent. Some customers might place greater value on cloud
storage or want to access their hard drive if Cablevision's systems are offline. The lack
of absolute equivalence demonstrates why a discussion of relative functional
equivalence is necessary. With respect to video recording and playback, the two systems
are functionally equivalent.
76 Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121,125 (2d Cir. 2008), cert.
denied,557 U.S. 946 (2009).
7 A Slingbox is a device that connects a user's cable box, satellite dish, or DVR to
the internet so that signals can be streamed and observed in any location and on a
variety of computers and mobile devices. WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. 712 F.3d 676,
680 & n.2 (2d Cir. 2013). But see infranotes 85-86 and accompanying text, explaining
how this functional equivalent might not apply to all of Aereo's subscribers. It is also
worth noting that the legality of a combination Slingbox/DVR is also the subject of
ongoing litigation. See Fox Broad. Co. Inc. v. Dish Network, L.C.C., 905 F. Supp. 2d
1088 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
78 CompareAm. Broadcastine Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498. 2508-09
(2014) (observing that the "viewing experience of Aereo's subscribers" is no different
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B. The Pure-FunctionalApproach

Under a pure-functional approach, the legitimacy of a technology
would depend solely on the technology's functional capabilities. The
approach considers implementation details only to the extent necessary
to understand what functions the technology performs and to ensure
that Congress has not explicitly prohibited the implementing
technology. Of course, because this approach provides a framework of
statutory interpretation, any explicit technical prohibition or
requirement provided by Congress must be considered. 79 However,
under this approach, courts would interpret all statutory language, as
much as possible, to speak to permitted functionality.
To determine whether a given function is permitted under the
Copyright Act, courts should use standard tools of statutory
interpretation: they should consider the plain language of the statute,
the intent of Congress (both the current Congress and the enacting
Congress), 80 and the motivating goal of copyright law to balance
authors' exclusive rights against the public's right to take advantage of
creative works. Courts should also consider whether the technology in
question is functionally equivalent to another statutorily or judicially
approved technology. Functional equivalence to an approved
technology should create a large presumption that the technology is
legitimate.
Of course, while the decision to adopt a functional approach
would likely simplify cases, it would not necessarily determine the
outcome of any given case. Courts would still have to determine what
functionality is implicated by a contested technology, and courts would
still have to decide whether that functionality runs afoul of the
Copyright Act. A few examples will be helpful.
Under a pure-functional approach, one could argue that the
transfer of digital files as construed in ReDigi should be permitted
under the first-sale doctrine. The basis for the court's decision in

than the viewing experience of cable comoany subscribers) with Am. Broadcasting
Cos.. 134 S. Ct. at 2515 (Scalia. J.. dissenting) (finding that "there are material
differences between ... cable systems ... and Aereo").
79 In practice, very few portions of the Copyright Act contain direct technical
prohibitions. While the Act contains a few technical definitions, e.g., "semiconductor
chip product" and "mask work," most prohibitions and limitations on activities are
made with reference to function. In fact, many definitions are made with reference to
any device or process "now known or later developed," indicating that the specific
technology does not matter as much as what the technology is doing. See generally17
U.S.C. § 101 (2012). Insofar as judges believe technical prohibitions are unavoidable,
my criticism does not apply.
80 See EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES 9-14
(2008).

140

BUFFALO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTYLA WJOURNAL

[Vol. X

ReDigirelied on a technical assessment of the technology."' The court
found that the ReDigiservice violated the reproduction right because
the transfer of a file necessarily requires copying the file. 82 From a
functional perspective, however, one could argue this intermediate
copying is insignificant. If we were to ignore the implementation details
of the transaction, we would simply compare the state of the file before
the transaction with the state of the file after the transaction. Before
the transaction, the file resides on the seller's computer, and after the
transaction, the file resides on the buyer's computer.83 Because the
functional output does not multiply files or permit use by multiple
users, no exclusive copyright privilege is implicated in the sale.
Alternatively, one could argue that ReDigi's transfer of files should be
prohibited because it would allow users to resell goods faster than ever
before. One could argue that increased speed and lower transaction
costs would undermine the incentive authors have to develop and share
creative works.8 For the purposes of this paper, the outcome of any
given case is not as important as the reasoning used to arrive at the
outcome. While the ReDigi court based its arguments on the technical
act of "copying," the arguments above show how it could have reached
the same conclusion under a functional approach.
A similar argument can be made in the context of the Aereo case.
That is,one could argue that a pure-functional approach would likely
prohibit the Aereo system. Aereo allowed some users to receive
broadcast signals they would not have been able to receive without the
service. As such, from a functional perspective, Aereo rebroadcast
television signals to its subscribers-a function the Transmit Clause was
explicitly designed to prohibit. 86 Alternatively, one could argue, as

81 See discussionsupra,in Part I.
82

Id
That the seller might be able to make a copy of the file to elude ReDigi's file
scanning system might be significant in an overall review of the service, particularly if
the services' promoters encouraged or induced the creation and retention of such
copies. See generallyMetro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster,Ltd., 549 U.S.
913 (2005). However, the evidence presented in ReDigi did not indicate such
inducement, and because maintained/withheld copies are no less a problem for the
permitted sale of digital files in tangible media (for example if a buyer sells a CD, there
is no mechanism to prevent him from keeping a backup copy of the CD), this problem
is not unique to ReDigis service and should not impact the analysis in any meaningful
way.
8 This argument is discussed in more detail infra,in Part IV.B.2.
85 This is because not all subscribers to Aereo lived in a location that enabled them
to receive normal broadcast signals.
86 American BroadcastinQ Cos.. Inc. v. Aereo. Inc.. 134 S. Ct. 2498. 2506
(2014). Note that Aereo would be imoermissible for users who live outside the
broadcast zone not because it allows them to access broadcasts on demand over the
internet, but rather because it allows them to access broadcasts at all.With respect to
83
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Justice Scalia did, that because each transmission was initiated by
Aereo's users (rather than by Aereo itself), Aereo could not be held
liable for creating anyperformance, let alone a public one.87
C FunctionalReducibility: Testing the TechnicalApproach

It is easy to think that the functional and technical approaches
might be two roads to the same place-that the courts' technical
guidelines might match up with the qualitative, functional goals of the
Copyright Act. To determine whether this is true, we need a way to
translate technical guidelines into functional implications. This is where
functional reducibility comes into play.
This Part will have two Sections. First, I will introduce the concept
of functional reducibility. Second, I will use functional reducibility to
show that the functional and technical approaches are qualitatively
different and lead to substantially different results.
1. FunctionalReducibilityDefined

Ironically, the concept of reducibility lies at the core of theoretical
computer science and is itself quite technical. Computer scientists say a
problem Xis reducible to another problem Yif the solution to Ycan
be used to solve X 88 As a simple example, we can say that
multiplication is reducible to addition since one can use repeated
applications of addition to achieve the effect of multiplication.
Computer scientists use reducibility analysis to compare the difficulty
of two computational problems. But because we want to compare
technologies rather than theoretical problems, we need to develop a
new understanding of reducibility. This form of reducibility, which I call
functionalreducibility, compares two instances of technology based on
the end-user experiences that can be crafted from their underlying
implementations.
We can say an instance of technology Xis functionally reducible

users who can receive the oricinal broadcast transmissions. Aereo would be
permissible. For these users, Aereo is functionally equivalent to a DVR and Slinabox.
Because Aereo extended the reach of the oriainal broadcast zone. one could areue
that Aereo moved beyond functional eauivalence. in violation of the Coovricht Act.
Aereo tried to limit this problem by reauirina its subscribers to aeree not to "use or
attemot to use [Aereo's service] to access signals that are not available in [their]
Home Market." Aereo Terms of Use.
AEREO, https://www.aereo.com/terms [http://perma.cc/JUA4-7AG7].
87 The majority found this functional difference irrelevant. Id. at 2514.
8 THOMAS H. CORMEN ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO ALGORITHMS 1067 (3d ed. 2009)
("Intuitively, a problem Qcan be reduced to another problem O'if any instance of 0
can be 'easily rephrased as an instance of 0', the solution to which provides a solution
to the instance of 0.").
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to an instance of technology Y if one can use the underlying
implementation of Y to achieve functionality that is identical to X
without relying on any significant innovative technological
advancements. For example, we can say a pair of eyeglasses is
functionally reducible to a monocle. Once you have the ability to make
a monocle, it is possible to make a pair of eyeglasses without any
significant technological advancements.89 Conversely, a DVD player is
not functionally reducible to a VCR. Because the two technologies
work in fundamentally different ways, the technology underlying a
VCR does not provide any insight into the workings of a DVD player.
It is important to recognize that functional reducibility analysis
does not take into account the efficiency, expense, or difficulty of the
steps needed to arrive at functional equivalence. 9' For example, with
respect to power generating abilities (energy output), a nuclear reactor
is functionally reducible to a windmill. The relevant consideration is
whether a windmill can, without any technological advancements,
generate power in the same form and amounts as a nuclear reactor. The
fact that nuclear reactors generate power eight times faster 9 than
windmills does not impact the reducibility analysis.93

Interestingly enough, in the context of simple devices, it is possible for two
technologies to be functionally reducible to each other without being functionally
equivalent. Eyeglasses and monocles are one such example. Given the ability to make
eyeglasses, it is a fairly trivial task to produce monocles. Similarly, if one has the ability
to make monocles, one can, without much difficulty, make a pair of eyeglasses.
90 Likewise, a VCR is not functionally reducible to a DVD player. In this sense,
functional reducibility analysis is unbiased with respect to the quality of a technology.
A DVD player certainly provides technology that improves upon the VCR. But
because a VCR and DVD player are not functionally equivalent (with respect to
playing videos), and because the technology of a DVD player cannot be used to create
a VCR, the two technologies are not functionally reducible in either direction.
Note also that if two technologies are functionally equivalent, each technology is
functionally reducible to the other. This follows immediately from the definitions of
equivalence and reducibility. If two technologies are functionally equivalent, then it is
of course possible to achieve identical functionality without any significant
technological advancements-indeed, it is possible to achieve identical functionality
without any advancements.
91 Multiplication is reducible to addition because one can use repeated additions to
achieve the effect of multiplication. It is of no import that, in some instances
89

(1000000*504,000, for example), the multiplication would require millions of additions.
The analysis focuses only on whether, given one solution, another solution is possible.
92 A series of small wind turbines can generate 1.5 terawatt hours per year, Smallscale
Wind
Energy,
CARBON
TRUST
(Aug.
2008),
http://www.carbontrust.com/resources/reports/technology/small-scale-wind-energy
[http://perma.cc/N4GD-OB4Z], while an average nuclear reactor can generate 12.2
terawatt hours per year, Frequently Asked Questions, UNITED STATES ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN.
(July
27,
2012),
http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=104&t=3
[http://perma.cclT5QG-7KGP].
93 Of course, if we wanted to make reducibility analysis more complex, we could
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2. FunctionalReducibilityas a Measurement.Bridgingthe Gap

Qualitatively
Functional reducibility is helpful in the current context because it
allows us to understand the extent to which the courts' technical focus
deviates from the functional approach. The premise behind the
technical-approach cases discussed above is that some implementations
infringe on copyright while others do not: streaming technology that
uses a central data source (such as a DVD) violates the public
performance right, while a technology that creates thousands of
"unique" copies does not; a digital "transfer" of files violates the
reproduction right, while a 1.2 second buffer-copy does not, etc.
Because these determinations are based on implementation rather than
function, they fit nicely into a model of functional reducibility.
Specifically, we can say that if a court approves some technology
X, the functions theoretically allowed by that approval would consist of
the set of functions corresponding to the technologies that reduce to X
This is because any technology (and thus any functionality) that
reduces to X could, by definition, be constructed using only courtapproved implementations, and would thus necessarily adhere to the
court's technical guidelines.94
Reducibility is significant because it shows that the functional and
technical approaches are not two roads to the same place -relative to
the functional approach, the pure-technical approach is over-inclusive
because it allows technologies that are a.) functionally reducible to a
judicially approved technology and b.) unable to withstand judicial
scrutiny under a functional approach. Likewise, we can say that the
pure-technical approach is under-inclusive because it prohibits
technologies that would be allowed under a functional approach . The
articulation of the gap in terms of over- and under-inclusiveness
implicates important value judgments that lend themselves to the
formation of an additional approach.
D. The Efficient-TechnicalApproach

The efficient-technical approach is something of a compromise
between the functional approach and the pure-technical approach.
Under the pure-technical approach, technologies must comport to
court guidelines. Under the efficient-technical approach, however,
technologies need only reduceto a technology that comports with court

add an efficiency factor. Such a factor is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.
94 The converse, however, is not true. If a court condemns some technology X, no
functions are disallowed, provided they can be made without using X I discuss this in
some detail infra,in Part III.
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guidelines. Evaluation under an efficient-technical approach would
thus involve a two-step system of analysis. First, courts would consider
what technologies, if any, the contested technology reduces to. Second,
courts would consider whether any of the reduced-to technologies
would be permissible according to a pure-technical approach.95
The efficient-technical approach does not change the courts'
current approach as much as it modifiesthe approach to avoid technical
"gimmicks" and inefficiencies. Rather than forcing companies to work
around technical restrictions, the efficient-technical approach allows
them to achieve identical results using sustainable, sensical, and
efficient engineering techniques. For example, under an efficienttechnical approach, if one accepts the holding of Cablevision,it would
be feasible to implement the Cablevision remote DVR system using
one centralized hard drive (rather than creating a unique copy for each
user). This is because one could achieve functionality identical to
Cablevision's RS-DVR system by storing one master copy of each
program and monitoring which programs a customer wanted to record.
All customers who chose to "record" a show prior to the show's original
broadcast would then have access to the master copy of the program.
Because this modified system is functionally equivalent to the
court-approved system and because it does not require any significant
technological advancements or innovation, we can say the modified
system reduces to the court-approved implementation. As such, the
modified system would be permissible under the efficient-technical
approach. A similar argument could be made for implementing Aereo's
technology with one master antenna for each channel.
The efficient-technical approach is notable because it captures
many of the advantages of a pure-technical approach while avoiding
many of the disadvantages. This will be discussed in greater detail
below.
The relationship between the different approaches is explained in
Figure 2. Figure 2 also shows how the various approaches would view
the cases discussed above.

9s Note that if a technology is legitimate according to the courts' current technical
approach, it will also be permissible under the efficient -technical approach. Because all
technologies reduce to themselves, it follows immediately that a technology that
comports with the courts' current guidelines reduces to a technology that comports with
the courts' guidelines. This means that, relative to the pure-functional approach, the
efficient-technical approach is at least as over-inclusive as the pure-technical approach.
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2: UNDERSTANDING THE FUNCTIONAL AND TECHNICAL
APPROACHES TO PERMISSIBILITY

Cableison

implemented

with
master copies

Aereo

implemented

with a master

antenna for
of local broadcasts

Note that two of the seven zones indicated in the diagram will contain no technologies. Because
all technology reduces to itself, any technology that would be permissible under the puretechnical approach would also be permissible under the efficient-technical approach. As such,
the zones constituting the pure-technical approach and the intersection between the puretechnical and pure-functional approaches are included only for conceptually demonstrative
purposes. Any technology that falls in either of the two zones would actually lie in the
intersection between the pure-technical approach and the efficient-technical approach or in the
intersection of all three circles, respectively.
This figure can also be used to visualize the extent to which the pure-technical approach and
efficient-technical approach are over-inclusive and under-inclusive with respect to the purefunctional approach. An approach is over-inclusive insofar as it would allow a technology that
would not be allowed under the pure-functional approach. Likewise, an approach is underinclusive insofar as it would not allow a technology that would be allowed under the purefunctional approach. Given these understandings, we can see that both technical approaches are
over-inclusive, but that the pure-technical approach is less over-inclusive and more underinclusive than the efficient-technical approach. Note that, as described supra in Part ILB, the
functional approach does not necessarily lead to a clear answer or outcome in any given case.
Accordingly, my categorization of different technologies is by no means absolute. For example,
while I think ReDigi should be allowed under a functional approach, reasonable minds could
disagree. See discussion supra, in Part IIB.
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III. THE ADVANTAGES OF A FUNCTIONAL-APPROACH

In this Part, I will defend the pure-functional approach from a
variety of perspectives. My goal is to show that a functional approach is
constitutionally, statutorily, and practically preferable to a technical
approach. I also hope to show that a pure-functional approach would
lead to decisions that are clearer, easier to understand, and betterreasoned.

A. Innovation and Creativity
In this Section, I will show how the technical approach harms
innovation, technological growth, and business confidence.
A technical approach stands to harm innovation in two ways. First,
by prohibiting certain implementations, the technical approach shortcircuits innovation by reducing the incentive engineers have to improve
the efficiency or efficacy of the technology underlying the prohibited
implementations. An engineer will be less likely to build, improve, or
innovate on technology if the resultant improvement cannot easily be
used. Consider ReDigi's used marketplace for digital files. 96 Because of
the decision in CapitalRecords v. ReDigi, ReDigi no longer has a
reason to develop more efficient file transfer protocols. Similarly, the
decisions in Cablevision and Aereo have reduced the incentive for
companies to develop new solutions to concurrent-access problems 97 or
to create new mechanisms for mass file distribution.9 8

See discussion infra in Part I.
Because of the decisions in Cablevisionand Aereo, each user is assigned a unique
copy of a file. Absent these decisions, basic engineering principles would allow
companies to distribute data to consumers from one centralized copy. Because multiple
users would necessarily access the same copy at the same time, system engineers would
have to develop extra precautions to preserve system integrity. While the technical
details of this problem (and potential solutions) are beyond the scope of this paper, it
is worth noting that this is a relatively common problem that can be solved in a number
of ways. For an example of one approach to this problem, see The Secret to 10Million
Concurrent Connections-The Kernel Is the Problem, Not the Solution, HIGH
SCALABILITY (May 13, 2013), http://highscalability.com/blog/2013/5/13/the-secret-to[http://perma.cc/S4F3-D7GS];
10-million-concurrent-connections-the-kernel-i.html
See
also
Concepts:
Concurrency,
UNIV.
OF
HOUSTON,
http://sce.uhcl.edulhelm/rationalunifiedprocess/process/workflow/ana-desi/co_cncry.h
tm [http://perma.cclUPD7-6X43].
98 It is worth noting that "less" incentive does not mean "no incentive." Many
licensed services rely on these types of technologies and are constantly working on
solutions to these problems. Netflix, for example, licenses television programs from
content producers and, as a result, is not required to create a unique copy for each
subscriber. See Greg Kumparak, Netfix Spends $2B Per Year On Content,Primarily
On Licensing Movies And TV Shows, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 24, 2013),
http://techcrunch.com/2013/04/24/netflix-spends-2b-per-year-on-content-primarily-onlicensing-movies-and-tv-shows [http://perma.cc/5Y5G-EZMH]. The impact of courts'
96

97
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But the technical approach does not just prevent innovation with
respect to restricted technologies-it limits innovation in general.
Because the technical approach is indifferent towards function,
companies affected by technical restrictions will use their resources to
find alternate ways to achieve their desired functional goals." Because
the straightforward implementation is precluded, companies and
engineers must spend time, effort, and money designing around the
courts' limitations. In this sense, engineers are developing new
technologies, but these technologies are not driven by sound
engineering principles. Instead, they are guided almost exclusively by
the technical rules established by courts -rules that, as discussed below,
lead to inefficient designs. Thus, the technical approach's impact on
innovation is two-fold. First, engineers have less incentive to optimize
or advance the technologies prohibited by the courts, and second,
engineers are discouraged from developing technologies unrelatedto
the courts' technical restrictions.
Notably, the functional approach avoids both of the disadvantages
discussed above. First, because the functional approach does not
address the legal legitimacy of implementations, it does not sizably
impact the incentive engineers have to further develop or improve
upon existing technologies. Second, because there is no way to
"engineer around" a prohibited function, the functional approach does
not create any incentive for engineers to find loopholes in judicial
decisions.
So what, then, is the impact of a functional prohibition?
Interestingly, most technical innovations or advances can be used to
solve problems in a variety of contexts. Consider again the technical
problems referenced above: concurrent-access problems, file transfer
efficiency, and mass file distribution. These problems would persist't o
prohibitions is that fewer companies (and thus fewer engineers) are working on new
solutions to these problems, decreasing the likelihood that a new approach to the
problem will be found. Additionally, as described infra, the technical approach also
prevents engineers from developing new technologies unrelated to the courts'
prohibitions. Accordingly, the technical approach also makes it less likely that
engineers will work on projects that present new and novel engineering problems.
99 E.g., Vivian I. Kim, The PublicPerformanceRight in the DigitalAge: Cartoon
Network v. CSCHoldings,24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 263, 291 (2009) ("This gives cable
providers incentive to design systems solely for purposes of avoiding liability.").
1 For a discussion of the wide application of the above problems, see Dominique
Lebrun, The Problemof ConcurrentAccess to Data,PLATYPUS (Apr. 7, 2013)
(discussing applications of the concurrent access problem),
http://platypus.belighted.com/blog/2013/04/07/concurrent-access-to-data
[http://perma.cc/W7HY-HTVH], and Brian Tierney et. al., EfficientData Transfer
Protocolsfor BigData,(discussing applications of the file transfer and distribution
problems), http://www.es.net/assets/pubs-presos/eScience-networks.pdf
[http://perma.cc/84P8-7SYPJ.
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and be worth solving even if the functions or services were prohibited.
The result is that the functional approach is much less likely to create
barriers to technological advances.
B. ConstitutionalConsistency

The authority for the Copyright Act resides in Article 1, § 8 of the
Constitution: "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Scholars and
commentators have long recognized that the Progress Clause was
included for utilitarian purposes-to encourage innovation and
incentivize the creation and distribution of creative and scholarly
works.'01 As the Supreme Court recognized in Twentieth Century
Music Corp v. Aiken,

[t]he immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair
return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim
is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the
general public good. 'The sole interest of the United States
and the primary object in conferring the monopoly,' this
Court has said, 'lie in the general benefits derived by the
public from the labors of authors.' 102
In this Section, I will show how the Progress Clause supports a
functional approach to copyright law and how the Progress Clause
should lead courts to interpret the Copyright Act using a functional
approach.
1. The ProgressClauseSupports a FunctionalApproach to
CopyrightLaw

In this Section I will show how the functional approach to
copyright law advances the aims of the Progress Clause better than the
technical approach. Because the Progress Clause was designed to
encourage individuals to create and distribute creative and scholarly

10' Eg., LYDIA PALLAS LOREN & JOSEPH ScoTT MILLER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 342 ("Thus copyright law is meant to provide an incentive

not just for creation but for dissemination as well."); Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual
Property Clause's External Limitations, 61 DUKE L.J. 1329, 1366 (2012); Mark A.
Lemley, TheEconomicsoflmprovementinIntellectualPropertyLaw,75 TEx. L. REV.
989, 997 (1997).
10 Twentieth Century Music Corp, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (quoting Fox Film Corp.
v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)).
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works, the Clause suggests a utilitarian analysis.1 03 Accordingly, when
evaluating the constitutional consistency of the two competing
approaches, we should compare the extent to which the two approaches
encourage the creation and dissemination of new works." There are
two reasons why these criteria, and thus the Progress Clause, support a
functional approach to copyright law.
First, assuming there is desirable content, authors, creators, and
the general public make decisions based on functional implications
rather than production considerations. When deciding whether to buy
a book, consumers seem to be indifferent to the technology used to
publish the book or the software used to write the book. Instead,
consumers seem to care about how they will interact with the book will they enjoy the story, will the text fade overnight, will the binding
withstand a lot of pressure, etc. Likewise, when deciding whether to
subscribe to Aereo, consumers have no reason to consider the
implementation-assuming constant price and functional equivalence,
consumers have no reason to prefer a system with millions of antennas
over a system with one central antenna -and every reason to consider
functionality-how much will the service cost, what television programs
does it cover, how difficult is it to record a show, etc.
These incentives are not limited to consumers. Authors and
content-creators also seem to be driven by functional considerations.
And this makes sense-the financial success of a creative work depends
on how the work is perceived by the general public, meaning authors
have a financial incentive to internalize the functional preferences of
their consumers. In the rare instances where implementation is a
consideration (either for consumers or authors), it is only a
consideration because the implementation itself is functionally
beneficial in some way-whether that function is eco-friendliness,os
increased prestige,'" cost, or perceived efficacy.

See supra note 101.
In this Section, the analysis is constitutional, not statutory. That is, I am
concerned with the question of what types of rules we should have - whether our rules
should be based on functional guidelines or technical guidelines. Accordingly, this
analysis is conducted on a theoretical level, apart from the Copyright Act and the
decisions discussed above.
105 Andrea Divirgilio, Most Expensive Electric Cars for the Eco-Friendly
Billionaires,BORNRICH (June 13, 2012), http://www.bornrich.com/expensive-electriccars-eco-friendly-billionaires.htmi [http://perma.cc/4TQ9-R7KH] (explaining demand
for expensive electric cars).
106 Mark Milian, Apple Removes $1,000 Featureless iPhone Application, L.A.
TIMES (Aug. 7,2008), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2008/08/iphone-i-amric.html [http://perma.cc/9WV2-H82Z] (describing a $1,000 app, "I am Rich," which
was purchased eight times by buyers who wanted to "alert people that [they] have
money in the bank").
103
10
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The second reason why the Progress Clause supports a functional
approach to the Copyright Act is that the technical approach decreases
innovation and hinders the development of technologies. As
demonstrated by television, the internet, and even the ReDigi service,
new technologies allow people to communicate in new ways,'" on new
terms,'08 and in medium-dependent 09 forms. Accordingly, incentives
that promote the creation of communicative-technologies are at least
as important as incentives that promote communication itself.
Likewise, rules that discourage the creation of communicativetechnologies are at least as harmful as rules that discourage
communication.
In sum, because the goal of the Progress Clause is to create
incentives that promote the creation and dissemination of creative
works, 0 and because incentives are determined by function, we can
conclude that the aims of the Progress Clause are best advanced by a
functional approach.
2. The ProgressClauseSuggests thatCourtsShould Interpretthe
CopyrightAct According to a FunctionalApproach
While the Constitution seems to favor a functional approach to
copyright law, the question of constitutional interpretation is distinct
from the question of statutory interpretation. In this Section, I will
argue that the Progress Clause, as construed above, provides courts
with a good reason to interpret the Copyright Act in a manner
consistent with a functional approach.
It is a common canon of statutory interpretation that, given two
possible interpretations of a statute, courts should choose the
interpretation that avoids constitutional conflict."' As argued above, a

0 See Andrew Lasane, MoMA Defends Inclusion of Video Games in Applied
Design Exhibition, COMPLEX (June 3, 2013), http://www.complex.com/artdesign/2013/06/ted-talk-moma-defends-video-games-in-applied-design-exhibition
[http://perma.cc/J3HE-64L2] (recognizing video games as a new method of
communication).
108 See Andrea Chang, Photo App Snapchat'sAllure is Images' FleetingNature,
JOURNAL SENTINEL ONLINE (June 9, 2013), m.jsonline.com/business/photo-appsnapchats-allure-is-images-fleeting-nature-b9927947zl-210763431.html
[http://perma.cc/DP8Y-AYTY] (discussing a new app that allows users to send selfdeleting messages).
109 For example, consider Zombies, Run!, a phone app that uses GPS and other
mobile technology to tell users a dynamic story generated from the user's local
surroundings.
ZOMBIES,
RUN!,
https://www.zombiesrungame.com
[http://perma.cc/KUW4-YPPCJ.
110 See supranotes 98-99 and accompanying text.
" United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401 (1916) ("A statute must be
construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is
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technical approach to copyright law does run contrary to the aims of
the Progress Clause; and while the Supreme Court has interpreted the
Clause to give Congress considerable latitude and discretion,1 12 it is not
clear that the latitude extends far enough to justify an interpretation
that inhibits the creation and dissemination of creative works. Because
the technical approach would lead to sizable constitutional concerns,
courts should, in the face of ambiguity, interpret the Act according to a
functional approach.
In response to this argument, supporters of the technical approach
could argue that the latitude given to Congress would extend far
enough to save a technical interpretation of the Copyright Act. While
this argument might be correct, it does not change the outcome of my
analysis-the fact that a constitutionally suspect construction of a
statute would not actually be considered a constitutional violation does
not preclude the application of the avoidance canon.113 Moreover, even
if the technical approach would fall clearly on the side of
constitutionality, a court should, in the face of statutory ambiguity,
construe statutes in the manner most consistent with the aims of the
Constitution. 114 As argued above, those aims clearly support a
functional interpretation. The Supreme Court came to the same
conclusion. As the Court explained, "[w]hen technological change has
rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the Copyright Act must be
construed in light of [its] basic purpose." 15

unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that score."); ELHAUGE, supranote 52, at
237-239; see Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2573 (2012) ("Every
reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from
unconstitutionality." (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648,657 (1895))).
112 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 205 (2003) (applying rational basis review
to Congress' durational extension of the copyright term).
113 Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005) ("providing examples where the
Court construed a statute narrowly to avoid a constitutional question ultimately
resolved in favor of the broader reading"(citing Adrian Vermeule, Saving
Constructions,85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1960-61 (1997))); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public
Values in StatutoryInterpretation,137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1021 (1989) ("The Court
can also update statutes by construing them to reflect ... values as they relate to the
Constitution.... The Court interprets a statute to avoid constitutional problems even
though the broader interpretation would not necessarily be invalid.").
114 This view is consistent with at least two of the common justifications for
constitutional avoidance. The first justification is that avoidance is a means of
determining Congressional intent-that, unless the text of a statute suggests otherwise,
courts should presume that Congress intends legislation to be consistent with the values
and spirit of the Constitution. The second justification is that courts should interpret
statutes to advance constitutional norms and that, in doing so, courts will encourage
Congress to discuss, consider, and incorporate those norms into their discussions
surrounding statutes. Clark,543 U.S. at 382.
115 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151,156 (1975).
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C BetterAdjudication
The third reason why courts should adopt a functional approach is
that it allows for better adjudication. This is true for two reasons. First,
because judges do not generally have the expertise needed to consider
and evaluate intricate technical details, and second, because judges are
especially good at evaluating qualitative functionality. As we will see,
the end result is that a functional approach, if adopted, would lead to
decisions that are at once more consistent, better-reasoned, and easier
to understand.

1. JudgesAre Not GoodatEvaluatingTechnicalDetails
In this Section, I will show how, in practice, relying on judges with
little or no technical expertise significantly exacerbates some of the
problems discussed in the previous two Sections.
Unfortunately, judges are generally ill-equipped to evaluate
technology. Judges do not receive technical training, do not generally
hold degrees in mathematics, computer science, or engineering, and do
not deal with technical issues on a regular basis." 6 Numerous cases
show how this lack of technical expertise negatively impacts the way
judges decide technology-based cases. In one case, a judge ordered a
defendant to "retrieve ... code" that had been widely disseminated

over the internet.'17 In another, a judge attempted to resolve a claim
under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act by insisting that
"data transmitted over WiFi is not radio communication.""' At least
one judge admitted that he "[did not] really understand what a Web
site is." 119 These are not isolated examples. When it comes to
technology, judicial ignorance exists even at the Supreme Court.120 In
116 I exclude from this analysis judges on the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals.
While my criticism would assuredly apply to many of these judges, copyright disputes
are not generally in the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction. Accordingly, the merit of the
Federal Circuit and its judges is not relevant to this discussion.
117 Mike Masnick, The PS3Hack Injunction Shows the Problemsof Judges Who
Don't UnderstandTechnology, TECHDIRT (Feb. 1, 2011),
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110201/00580112903/ps3-hack-injunction-showsproblems-judges-who-dont-understand-technology.shtml [http://perma.cc/XV5KSBAE].
118 Mike Masnick, Judge Who Doesn't UnderstandTechnologySays WiFilsNot a
Radio Communication,TECHDIRT (July 1, 2011),
http://www.techdirt.com/blog/wireless/articles/20110701/12225114934/judge-whodoesnt-understand-technology-says-wifi-is-not-radio-communication.shtml
[http://perma.cclV2K8-XAYF].
119 Jon Skillings, UK Judge Stumped by Web Lingo, CNET (May 17,2007, 10:06
AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/u-k-judge-stumped-by-web-lingo/
[http://perma.cc/RH6S-SMCK].
120 See Kimberly
Atkins, Technical Difficulties at the Supreme Court,
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sum, it is no stretch to say that judges do not generally understand how
technology works. 2 1
In the context of a technical approach to copyright law, this is
problematic for two reasons: it leads to poorly written opinions and it
creates bad law. I will explore each of these in turn.

i. Poorly Written Opinions
There are three reasons why judges' generally poor understanding
of technology leads to poorly written opinions. First, judges' lack of
technical expertise may make it difficult for them to understand the
implementations and technologies at issue in their cases. Because cases
often revolve around these type of details, judges' lack of expertise
would likely make it more difficult for them to reach a clear conclusion
or holding. While this would almost certainly lead to bad law (discussed
below), it would also make it more difficult for judges to craft opinions
that are clear and understandable. Indeed, as author William Zinsser
observed, clear writing cannot exist without clear thinking.122
Second, judges' lack of technical expertise can make it difficult for
them to cleanly and clearly communicatetheir intended holding for the
case (regardless of whether the holding itself is clear). Under a technical
approach, a decision on the merits would almost always be made on
technical grounds. This means judges would, at a minimum need to
explain the technology at issue in their cases and explain their
implementation-based rule or holding. The problem is that writing
about technical details and implementations is difficult, even for
experts in the field. 123 For those with little technical experience,
describing the technology cleanly and clearly would be at best
extremely challenging and at worst impossible.
Finally, the impact of the two communicative shortcomings is
magnified by judges' necessary reliance on precedent. The

(Apr.
19,
2010),
http://lawyersusaonline.com/dcdicta/2010/04/19/technical-difficulties-at-the-supremecourt-2 [http://perma.cc/22FT-MC8E]; see also Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v.
Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2120 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that
he does not have expertise in the "fine details of molecular biology").
121 See Ameet Sachdev, FederalJudge RichardPosnerTakes on Science andLaw,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE,
May 11, 2012, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-0511/business/ct-biz-0511-chicago-law-20120511_1-judges-law-clerks-7th-circuit-barassociation [http://perma.cc/74PM-WBX2].
122 WILLIAM ZINSSER, ON WRITING WELL 8 (2006) ("It's impossible for a muddy
thinker to write good English.").
123 Roy Tennant, Talking Tech: Explaining Technical Topics to a Non-Technical
LAWYERSUSA

Audience, in TECHNOLOGY IN LIBRARIES: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ANNE GRODZINS

LIPow 93 (Roy Tennant
[http://perma.ce/8HX5-JUSU].

ed.,

2008),

http://techinlibraries.com/tennant.pdf
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communication problems are bad enough when limited to one case, but
when judges are called upon to consider, explain, and apply technical
reasoning from previous cases, the opinion-writing process seems to
become an extended game of "telephone," as previous decisions
themselves must be parsed and analyzed so that a judge's intent can
properly be ascertained.
The net effect is that understanding a technical decision is like
understanding a message written in German and translated first to
French, then to Chinese, and finally to Klingon. Each step along the
way-engineer to lawyer, lawyer to judge, judge to opinion, and past
opinion to future opinion, is likely to result in miscommunication,
confusion, or a skewing of the technical analysis. For examples of this
effect, one can consider the decisions discussed in Part I. Cablevision's
discussion involving "the performance of a performance," Redd
Horne's and Cablevision's discussion of "unique copy," and even
ReDig/'s discussion of what it means to transfer a file, each involve
stilted, confusing, and somewhat counter-intuitive explanations and
analysis of technology.
Judges write opinions to bring clarity to law and to establish the
constitutional and statutory boundaries of legislation and executive
action. The more muddled an opinion, the less clarity and insight it
brings to the dispute at hand, and the more confusion it causes when
considered in future cases.
Confusing cases are especially problematic in the technology
sphere because companies have good reason to consider the legal
landscape when considering which services and technologies to
develop. If the relevant decisions are confusing, muddled, or difficult to
understand, then it will be difficult for companies to know whether their
proposed technology is compliant with the decisions. This means there
is a higher risk, and thus a higher expected cost, associated with
developing new services and technologies. Thus, the impact of unclear
opinions and of a technically uninformed judiciary magnifies the
innovational claims presented above and runs contrary to the purpose
of the Copyright Act and the Progress Clause. 124
ii. BadDecisions
The second problem associated with the technical approach is that
a judge's lack of technical sophistication may lead to decisions that are
at once over-inclusive and under-inclusive. Judges who do not
understand how technology works cannot easily understand the
practical implications of their technical decisions-they cannot
124

See discussionsupra in Part II.A and Part II.B.
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understand the extent to which their decisions will stifle innovation and
cannot envision the functionality their decisions would preclude.
Consequently, it is difficult for judges to write opinions in a way that
would minimize the functional or innovative impact.125 As a result,
whatever harm might be associated with a technical approach on a
theoreticallevel would likely be magnified on the practical level,
making the technical approach more restrictive than it needs to be.
At the same time, because engineers have an advanced
understanding of technical details, it is difficult for judges to craft
decisions with enough precision to avoid legal loopholes. Enterprising
engineers have the expertise to design technologies that violate the
spirit and intent of the Copyright Act while still complying with the
technical holdings of previous cases. For a real world example of a legal
loophole, consider Aereo, which used the technical imprimatur from
Cablevision to short-circuit Congress' explicit intent to prevent the
rebroadcast of television signals. 126 For another example, consider the
Second Circuit's holding that 1.2 seconds is only transitory and thus that
data held for that brief period of time cannot qualify as "fixed" for the
purpose of finding a violation of the § 106(1) reproduction right.127
Using this technical holding, a creative engineer could create an endrun around copyright as follows:
Take a 90 minute movie. 90 minutes*60 seconds=5,400
seconds.
b. Take 5,400 micro-hard drives, each of which can store 1
second of video. Number the hard-drives from 1 to 5,400 and
load the movie onto the drives, such that the xth second of the
movie is located on hard drive x (the 1st second is on hard
drive 1, the 2nd second is on hard drive 2, etc.).
c. Create a cycle, whereby each hard drive continuously
transfers its one second of video to the previously-numbered
hard drive (e.g., 5 transfers to 4, 4 transfers to 3, etc.), except
for hard drive 1, which transfers data to hard drive 5,400. Note
that each copy is constantly overwritten with each transfer
and thus technically does not persist for longer than 1.2
seconds. Hard drive 1 is used a buffer drive to play the video.
d. Use an indexing system to keep track of which micro harddrive will have which second of the movie at each point in
a.

125 CL Am. Broadcasting Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2517 (2014)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's attempt to limit its holding would
likely fail).
126 See supranote 86 and accompanying text.
127 See supra Part
.
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time. Use the indexing system to keep the drives synchronized
so that a user can play the movie in full.
This system continuously reads a movie, yet does not make a
persistent copy. And unlike Cablevision's RS-DVR, this system does
not require any access to the internet or any other external source.
Thus, even though there is permanent access to the copyrighted
material, and even though the copyrighted material is continuously
copied, this system can claim to be justified by the holding in
Cablevision.12 8 Similarly, one could "break" the transmit clause simply
by using a 1.2 second buffer (similar or identical to the one used by
Cablevision) to create a separate transmission stream for any number
of subscribers. Because no copy lasts for more than 1.2 seconds, and
because each subscriber would receive a "different copy," Cablevision's
unwarranted fascination with and ultimate emphasis on technical
implementation would appear to justify such a system from a technical
standpoint, even though the resulting device would almost certainly
contravene most judges' understanding of the Copyright Act.
The harms associated with such slavish replication of judicially
approved technologies are two-fold. First, as demonstrated clearly by
the micro-hard drive example, they allow companies and engineers to
effectively circumvent the intent of copyright law. Second, and perhaps
less obvious, these workaround systems are atrociously inefficient. The
system at issue in Cablevision,for example, would, if implemented, use
millions of hard drives to store information that could just as easily be
stored on one hard drive. 129 Likewise, the systems at issue in Aereo
used millions of antennas to capture incoming broadcasts when it could
accomplish identical functionality using just one antenna. Courts and
scholars have long recognized the value and need for judiciallyprompted efficiency.13 0 Technical workarounds, and thus the approach

128 This is perhaps the most obvious example of why we
should use a functional
approach. After reviewing the purposes and overall legislative scheme of the Copyright
Act, we want to say this sort of system should not be allowed-yet we cannot do so
without an appeal to function. That this system could be justified by a technical
approach (even if, ultimately, a court might find some technical-based justification to
prohibit it) is reason enough to reject the technical approach. No similar analogue exists
for the functional approach.
129 As stated above, to avoid qualifying as a "public performance," Cablevision
planned to store as many copies of a program as were requested rather than storing one
central copy. "If 1000 customers want to record a specific episode of HBO's 'The Wire,'
1000 separate copies of that episode are made, each copy uniquely associated by
identifiers with the set-top box of the requesting customer." Brief for PlaintiffsCounter-Defendants-Appellees at 19, Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536
F.3d 121, 125 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. denied,129 S. Ct. 2890 (2009) (No. 07-7511).
130 See, e.g., Marnie H. Pulver, Electronic Media Discovery: The Economic Benefit
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that spurs these workarounds, directly contradict and hinder the goals
of judicially crafted efficiency.
In response to these arguments, a supporter of the technical
approach could claim that my argument employs circular reasoningthat it attempts to impugn a technical approach using criteria from a
functional approach, and thus assumes the result it attempts to prove.
The supporter could further argue that, by definition, the decisions that
emerge from a technical approach are no more over-inclusive or underinclusive than decisions issued in other areas of law-that judges
evaluate implementations according to the language of the Copyright
Act and issue their decisions accordingly. Proponents of the technical
approach could argue that, insofar as future technologies are consistent
with a technical decision, they are not loopholes as much as they are
legitimately legally permissible. Finally, a supporter could argue that
the impact on future innovation and functionality are irrelevant-that
a judge's primary concern should be whether a technology violates the
Copyright Act and that questions of innovation and functionality
should be left to Congress.
I have several answers to these arguments. First, in response to the
claim that my arguments employ circular reasoning, I would point to
the fact that the question of how to evaluate technology is distinct from
the question of how to evaluate the impactof technology. The technical
and functional approaches differ in how they evaluate technology-but
judges under both approaches would consider the impact of their
decisions. My position is first, that judges are (for a variety of reasons)
better able to consider that impact when considering end-user
functionality than they are when considering internal implementation,
and second, that the functional approach is more closely connected to
utility considerations than the technical approach.
Second, the argument that the technical approach is neither overnor under- inclusive assumes the conclusion it is trying to show-that
is, it assumes that decisions made under a technical approach would be
made properly and correctly. The analysis presented above provides
several reasons and examples illustrating why this is not the case.
Without technical expertise, judges will not be able to pair the language
of the statute with the technologies under consideration.
Finally, the argument that judges should not consider the impact
their decisions would have on incentives, innovation, or future
technologies advances a legal fiction. Judges can and do make policybased determinations on a regular basis. As one scholar observed,
of Pay-Per-View, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1379, 1394-95 nn. 85-86 (2000) (citing a series
of decisions and papers that discuss the importance of and need for efficient
lawmaking).
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"[a]sking whether judges have a policy-making role in the American
system of government is like asking whether gravity has a role in the
solar system."131 Judicial policymaking ispart of the American judicial
system-and the worse the policy implications of a decision, the less
likely it is that a judge will make that decision. Because judges
necessarily engage in consequential decision making, it is important
that they do so with an accurate understanding of the consequences. As
argued above, this is not generally possible under the technical
approach.
2. Judges Are Good atEvaluatingFunction
When it comes to evaluating functionality, judges are able to make
full use of their analytical skill sets and are fully capable of making
decisions that are consistent, well-reasoned, and easy to apply. In fact,
judges employ functional analysis on a regular basis in the copyright
arena: judges use a functional approach when evaluating fair use
claims, 132 when considering whether a creation qualifies as "an original
work of authorship"l 33 or as a "work for hire"134 and when deciding
whether an assistant should qualify as a co-author for the purposes of
joint copyright ownership.1 35 Each of these potentially complex issues
requires judges to consider the goals of the Copyright Act, to think
about how the case before them relates to those goals, and to develop
(or apply) a decisional framework that faithfully and effectively
implements those goals. Notably, the judicial resolution of each of the
above issues resulted in a clear framework that is reasonably easy to
apply and evaluate in all but the closest of cases.
I introduce these examples not to suggest that the use of a
functional approach in these areas justifies the use of the approach
when evaluating technology, but rather to show how judges are wellequipped to analyze issues under a functional framework and to show
how judges have a great deal of experience with functional analysis.
When resolving each of the above issues, judges focused on
relationships-the relationship between the creative work and the
infringer, between the author and the creative work, and the
relationship between the author and the collaborator, respectively. In
sum, there is no reason why courts would be able to apply sensible
131 See, e.g., Linoa A. Graglia, Do Judges Have a Policy-Making Role
in the
American System of Government?,17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 119, 120 (1994).
132 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417 (1984); see
also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
133 Feist Publ'n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc.,
499 U.S. 340 (1991).
134 Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,
490 U.S. 730 (1989).
135 Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 1998).
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functional analysis in Grokster and Sony but not in Cablevision or
Aereo. As Judge Deny Chin recognized in his dissent from the denial
of rehearing en banc in Aereo, "[c]ourts should follow Congress's lead
and resist the urge to look 'under the hood' . . . . [O]ur inquiry should

be a functional one, as set forth in the statute."l 36
IV. THE ADVANTAGES (AND DISADVANTAGES) OF THE EFFICIENTTECHNICAL APPROACH

In a certain sense, my arguments in Part III advance a false
dichotomy. My analysis was predicated on a strict choice between two
alternatives-a pure-functional approach and a pure-technical
approach. As explained in Part I, however, there is at least one more
approach to consider-the efficient-technical approach. As stated
above, under an efficient-technical approach, a technology is noninfringing if it reduces to a court approved technology. Recall that
instance of technology Xreduces to instance of technology Yif one can
use technology Yto obtain functional equivalence with technology X
In this Part, I will consider the advantages and disadvantages associated
with the efficient-technical approach.
A. Advantages of the Efficient-TechnicalApproach

In this Section, I will discuss some of the advantages of the
efficient-technical approach. First, I will argue that, relative to a purefunctional approach, the efficient-technical approach is more
conservative and palatable to advocates of a technical approach.
Second, I will argue that, like a functional approach, the efficienttechnical approach is more efficient and will lead to less economic and
technological waste. Ultimately, I will conclude that while the efficienttechnical approach is in many ways an improvement on the puretechnical approach, the pure-functional approach is still preferable.

136 WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d
500, 512 (2d Cir. July 16, 2013) (Chin,
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
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The Efficient-TechnicalApproachIs Less RadicalandMore
Conservativethan a FunctionalApproach

One of the possible objections to the adoption of a functional
approach is that it tries to do too much too fast-that, if courts were to
adopt a functional approach, they would have to do so in a slow, stepby-step process, adopting intermediate approaches along the way. This
objection holds significantly less weight when applied to the efficienttechnical approach. As mentioned in Part I, the only difference
between a pure-technical approach and an efficient-technical approach
is how services are implemented. Because the mapping of permissible
services from the pure-technical approach to the efficient-functional
approach is one-to-one, it would be relatively easy for a court to justify
the efficient-technical approach without departing significantly from
current precedents or technical rules. In this sense, the efficienttechnical approach is more practical and realistic than a functional
approach.
2

The Efficient-TechnicalApproach Avoids Inefficiencies and
Waste

One of the largest disadvantages of a technical approach is that it
causes companies and engineers to "design around" implementation
rules. In Part III of this paper, I argued that these workaround
implementations are problematic because they directly conflict with the
aims of the Copyright Act and because they are monstrously inefficient.
The efficient-technical approach avoids both of these problems. As
stated above, the efficient-technical approach looks to technical details
only to determine whether a given service reduces to a court approved
implementation. Once such a reduction is established, the court would
not limit or restrict the manner in which a service is implemented.
Accordingly, under the efficient-technical approach, there is no need to
"design around" technical constraints. This means that, in comparison
to a pure-technical approach, the efficient-technical approach
promotes innovation and avoids inefficient, wasteful implementations.
B. The Disadvantagesof the Efficient-TechnicalApproach

In this Section, I will discuss some of the relative disadvantages of
the efficient-technical approach. First, I will argue that the approach
requires more technical analysis and judicial expertise than a puretechnical approach, exacerbating the adjudication related difficulties
discussed in Part III. Second, I will address concerns that this approach
might be too efficient.

2014]

1.

CuringCablevision

161

The Efficient-TechnicalApproachRequiresAdvanced
TechnicalAnalysis

One of the largest criticisms of a pure-technical approach is that it
requires judges to make decisions based on technical details they do not
and cannot readily understand. As argued above, this results in poorly
constructed decisions, confusing holdings, and judicial inconsistency.
Unfortunately, these problems apply with even more force to an
efficient-technical approach. In Part 1I, I explained that cases invoking
an efficient-technical approach would involve a two-step analysis. First,
courts would consider what technologies, if any, the contested
technology reduces to, and second, courts would consider whether any
of the reduced-to technologies would be permissible according to a
technical approach.
Each step of this analysis could easily require more technical
discussion and expertise than the whole amount of analysis involved in
the pure-technical approach. In the pure-technical approach, courts are
required to analyze the legitimacy of one technology to determine
whether the implementation of that technology should be permitted
under the Copyright Act. Under the efficient-technical approach,
however, courts might have to consider multiple technologies not just
to determine whether they conform to the Copyright Act, but also to
determine whether they qualify as reduced forms of the contested
technology. While dueling technical experts could assist in the effort,
the ultimate decision likely would be particularly challenging from both
legal and technical perspectives.
The first step of analysis under the efficient-technical approach
requires courts to consider which technologies qualify as reduced
versions of the contested technology. It is worth noting that any
assessment of reducibility requires more technical expertise than is
involved under a pure-technical approach. In determining whether
technology Xreduces to technology Y, one must understand how both
Xand Yfunction and how one would be able to use the implementation
of Yto obtain functional equivalence with X This type of analysis can
be incredibly involved and, in the context of technologies like video
streaming or file transfers, would be almost impossible for nontechnical judges to perform. These difficulties are exacerbated by the
fact, acknowledged above, that in any given case, judges would likely
have to invoke reducibility analysis multiple times (defendants would
likely point to several technologies to which their invention reduces,
requiring courts to consider each one).
The second step of analysis under an efficient-technical approach
requires courts to evaluate the reduced-to technology using a puretechnical approach. However, in the context of the efficient-technical

162

BUFFALO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTYLA WJOURNAL

[Vol. X

approach, the analysis is made more difficult for two reasons. First, as
with the starting step of analysis under this approach, courts will likely
have to evaluate multiple reduced-to technologies (and to consider
potential future technologies not currently before the court), meaning
that relative to the pure-technical approach this step likely would
involve several times the amount of technical analysis. Second, and
perhaps more problematic, is that the efficient-technical approach
requires only that it is conceptually possible to reduce the contested
technology to a court-approved technology-it does not require that a
company actually engineer, design, or produce the reduction.'3 7 This
means that, under the efficient-technical approach, judges would likely
have to evaluate the permissibility of abstract, theoretical
technologies-a task that is much more difficult than evaluating
concrete, implemented, and real technologies.
In sum, the efficient-technical approach represents something of a
compromise between the pure-functional and pure-technical
approaches. It avoids some of the inefficiencies of the pure-technical
approach, but it requires more technical analysis and expertise. The end
result is that, while the efficient-technical approach is interesting to
think about, it is less workable and more problematic than both the
pure technical and pure functional approaches.
2 The Problemswith Efficiency
As stated above, one of the largest benefits of the efficienttechnical approach is efficiency. Through reducibility analysis, the
approach allows companies and engineers to implement courtapproved services without resorting to unwieldy and inefficient
workarounds. But efficiency is not a silver bullet. In fact, some would
argue that inefficiencies are essential-that a system without
inefficiency is like a ski slope without friction-too fast and out of
control.3 In ReDigi,the District Court hinted that efficient technology
is not necessarily legally or even socially beneficial. Quoting the United
States Copyright Office, the court noted that
time, space, effort, and cost no longer act as barriers to the
movement of copies, since digital copies can be transmitted
nearly instantaneously anywhere in the world with minimal
effort and negligible cost. The need to transport physical
Indeed, if the approach did have such a requirement, then the efficiency
arguments presented earlier in this Part would not apply.
138 Eg., Samuel R. Gross, The American Advantage: The Value
of Inefficient
Litigation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 734, 752-56 (1987) (describing how inefficiencies result in
greater justice).
137
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copies of works, which acts as a natural brake on the effect of
resales on the copyright owner's market, no longer exists in
the realm of digital transmissions. The ability of such "used"
copies to compete for market share with new copies is thus
far greater in the digital world.139
By referring to the impact of digital files on the copyright owner's
market, the court (and the Copyright Office) was advancing the
argument that technical efficiency-instantaneous communication,
ease of transport, and permanence of goods-may fundamentally
change the relationship between authors and consumers. Under this
view, the more efficient a technology, the more protective courts may
need to be of authors' rights and incentives. This implicates the
efficient-technical approach. Because the approach allows technologies
to use anyimplementation, one could argue that the approach directly
circumvents the spirit and intent of the courts' technical constraints.
As an example, consider the micro-hard drive apparatus described
above. As stated above, the micro-hard drive system adheres to all
court-issued technical guidelines. Moreover, because the apparatus
only involves hard drives and file transfers, we can say that a simple
hard-drive containing a copyrighted movie reduces to the apparatus, 14 0
and thus would be permissible under the efficient-technical approach.
Now suppose arguendo that we do not yet have the technical
capabilities to sustain 5,400 micro-transfers, without error, for any
substantial period of time. If that were the case, then the fact that the
pure-technical approach would allow the hard-drive apparatus would
be of no import - there is no need to prohibit a technology that, because
of technical constraints, cannot be implemented. Under the efficienttechnical approach, however, the infeasibility of the micro-hard drive
system is irrelevant. The fact that a pure-technical approach would
allow the apparatus would justify the use of the functionally equivalent
single hard-drive implementation -an implementation that is more
efficient, and thus more effective at contravening the intent of the
Copyright Act.
In Part I, when describing functional reducibility, I stated that,
with respect to energy output, a windmill is functionally equivalent to a
139 Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi, No. 12 Civ. 95 (RJS),
11 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). It is
worth noting that this was not the court's justification for its decision. As stated in Part
I, the court adopted a technical approach and decided the case based on technical
details.
140 While the specific details are not relevant to this argument, the hard drive would
also have to delete all of its data each time it is powered up to have functional
equivalence to the 5,401 micro hard-drive apparatus (which, to avoid violating the
fixation requirement, would lose the copyrighted file upon losing power).
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nuclear power plant. While both can generate the same amount of
power, the fact remains that there are many who prefer the safety,
control, and moderation associated with wind power. Likewise, as the
Copyright Office and the ReDigicourt indicate, there are some who,
when considering the author-consumer exchange at the core of
copyright, would prefer to limit technological advancement and leave
things as they are.
Note that this criticism does not apply to the pure-functional
approach. While the functional approach does not invoke technical
limitations, it does consider the impact a technology will have on the
market and on the incentives authors have to share their work.
Accordingly, if a given implementation is "too efficient," then the
implementation would be rejected. However, this rejection would not
be predicated on the implementation itself, but would instead be based
on the functional impact of the implementation.
As a final thought, it is worth considering possible modifications
to the efficient-technical approach that would avoid the efficiency
problem. Specifically, one can imagine an alternate model that is
identical to the efficient-technical approach except that engineers
whose implementations deviate from the pure-technical approach
would be required to pay a fee to the relevant copyright owners. This
fee would be determined by the difference in implementation costs
between the efficient and inefficient constructions, but would be set so
as to discourage economic and technological waste. This approach
would compensate copyright owners, grant credence to the courts'
current technical guidelines, and incorporate a corrective factor that
would help preserve the appropriate incentives for authors to create
and share their creative works. While it is not as ideal as a purefunctional approach, it is a step in the right direction.141
V. CONCLUSION

In 1975, famous computer scientist Gordon Moore observed what
has come to be known as "Moore's Law." 142 According to Moore's
Law, "the number of transistors on a given chip can be doubled every
two years." 143 The increased number of transistors means that

This modified license approach likely strays too far from the current Copyright
Act. Accordingly, it is not likely an approach that can be adopted by the judiciary unless
Congress amends the Act. Even so, it is an interesting alternative to think about.
142 "Moore'sLaw" Predictsthe Futureof IntegratedCircuits,COMPUTER
HISTORY
http://www.computerhistory.org/semiconductor/timeline/1965-Moore.html
MUSEUM,
[http://perma.cclQZU6-NZG6].
143 Michael Kanellos, Moore's Law to Roll on for Another Decade, CNET NEWS
(Feb. 10, 2003), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1001-984051.html [http://perma.cc/TJ27141
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computing power doubles every 18 months. 144 As Moore's Law
suggests, modern computer chips are approximately one million times
more powerful than those of the 1970s. Unfortunately, Moore's Law
does not extend to the judiciary. Judges of the 21st century are no slower
or faster than those of the 1970s, and the judges of the 1970s are no
slower or faster than those of the 1850s. Given the rate of technical
progress, it should come as no surprise that it is difficult for individuals
without a technical background to keep up. In fact-it should come as
no surprise that it is difficult for individuals with a technical background
to keep up.145 I point out these difficulties not to impugn the judiciary.
Instead, my goal is to show the sheer irrationality inherent in any judgebased technical analysis. The rate of change is too fast and the impact
too significant for judicial decisions to be based on incomplete or
insufficient knowledge. Rather than engaging technology on its own
terms, judges should do what they do best-consider the intent of
Congress and the aims of the Constitution, evaluate the ways in which
people interact with technology, and deliver consistent, well-reasoned,
and clearly articulated decisions.
By recognizing the largest and most significant judicial strengths,
the functional approach enables the judiciary to keep up with
technology and allows judges to issue decisions that are clear,
reasonable, and, most importantly, consistent with the aims of the
Copyright Act. Judges do not make good engineers-but they do make
good judges.

6RCB].
1'" A
Deeper Law than Moore's?, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 10, 2011),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2011/10/computing-power
[http://perma.cc/B769-K9EF].
145 See, e.g., How to Keep Up to Date on the Latest Computer Science?
STACKOVERFLOW (Oct. 14, 2009), http://stackoverflow.com/questions/1567837/how[http://perma.cc/5JBE-Y76T],
to-keep-up-to-date-on-latest-computer-science
(illustrating that even experienced computer scientists have to do a fair amount of work
to remain aware of the newest protocols, algorithms, and methods).

